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Abstract 
 
The delay effect, that people discount the near future more than the distant future, has not 
been verified rigorously. An experiment conducted by us in China confirms that, by 
separating the delay from the interval, the delay effect exists only within a short delay. The 
results are reliable, because the rewards paid were very large, in order to elicit the subjects’ 
true preferences. The interval and magnitude effects are also confirmed. Finally, subjects’ 
procrastinating behavior, as reported in the questionnaire conducted at the end of the 
experiment, is explained by the time discount rates and the degree of the delay effect 
revealed in the experiment.  
 
 
JEL classification numbers: C91; D91 
Keywords: discount rate; economic experiment in China; delay effect; naïfs and 
sophisticates; procrastination 
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1.  Introduction 
This study examines an economic experiment conducted in China to explore how 
people discount future values. Although traditional economics has relied on the 
assumption of “exponential discounting,” i.e., that the time discount rate is constant 
over the time horizon, many experimental studies have found that the opposite is true: 
that is, people do not discount future values exponentially (Ainslie 1975, Benzion et al. 
1989, Kirby 1997, Kirby and Marakovic 1995, and Thaler 1981). This anomaly of 
discounting, that it is not constant over the time horizon, is called the delay effect, 
diminishing impatience, or hyperbolic discounting. In addition, it is known that discount 
rates depend on the value to be discounted: the smaller the value, the more intensively it 
is discounted, and this is called “the magnitude effect” (Benzion et al. 1989, Kirby and 
Marakovic 1995, Kirby 1997, and Thaler 1981).  
However, most studies of the delay effect face a problem. In experiments thus far, 
subjects are typically asked which of two options is more preferable: option A, in which 
the subjects will receive a reward in the near future, or option B, in which the subjects 
will receive a (usually larger) reward in the distant future. All options shown in the 
question are neatly identified with four experimental conditions: date s and amount X of 
receipt in option A; and date t (t > s) and amount Y (usually larger than X) in option B. 
Associated with these conditions, we call s the delay and the difference between the two 
points of time, st −  , the interval h. In what follows, we call the phenomenon that 
discount rates depend on the delay “the delay effect,” on the interval “the interval 
effect,” and on the reward amount “the magnitude effect.” 
Thus, the two concepts of time, the delay s and the interval h, should be 
distinguished as the factors that characterize intertemporal choices. The delay s is, 
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among other things, the focal point, because if time discounting depends on the delay, a 
plan made by such a person will be time-inconsistent. Nonetheless, most studies so far 
have not separated the delay from the interval, and subjects are asked to specify the 
amount of money that they would require, at some future date, to make them indifferent 
to receiving some amount now. In these studies, since the receipt time of the earlier 
option is fixed at now, their results should be interpreted as an investigation of the 
interval effect rather than the delay effect or, at least, as a mixture of these two effects.  
Read (2001) was the first to point out this problem. He conducted an experiment 
that separated the delay from the interval. He observed a form of the interval effect, but 
did not confirm the delay effect.1 However, although the delay effect exists even with 
quite a short delay (Frederick et al. 2002), the shortest delay used by Read was six 
months. Thus, whether subjects show the delay effect within a six-month delay remains 
an open question. Given these arguments, the primary aim of this study is to reexamine 
whether the delay effect is in fact found when the delay and the interval are explicitly 
distinguished. Our experiment differs from Read (2001) in that we investigated the 
delay effect using a much shorter delay than his. 
The second aim is to explain the procrastinating behavior of the subjects by their 
time discount rates and the degree of the delay effect. Although the delay effect is 
expected to cause procrastinating behaviors, because it means a high discount rate in the 
near future, it subsequently makes people regret that they procrastinated. Therefore, 
                                                  
1 Recently, Read and Roelofsma (2003) and Read et al. (2005) have reported that the delay effect is 
found in experiments in which subjects are asked questions in ways that differ from those in Read 
(2001). Read and Roelofsma (2003) utilized the matching method, which asks subjects about the 
amount at a specified date, which makes them indifferent to a specified option. This is different from 
the choice method used in Read (2001) and in the current study, which asks subjects to choose the 
better of two specified options. On the other hand, Read et al. (2005) focused on how the timing of 
two options is described and specified the timing with calendar dates. This method is different from 
Read (2001) and from the current paper, which specified the length of the delay. 
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after repeating this serious regret, they would stop procrastinating. Thus, the relation 
between the delay effect and procrastinating behavior is not straightforward. In this 
study, we investigate the relation based on the concept of naïfs and sophisticates, as 
developed by O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999). 
One merit of our study is that, in our experiments, we give the Chinese subjects 
strong incentives, by offering a high reward to induce them to reveal their true 
preference. This study examines whether real payment to all subjects is indispensable 
for eliciting the true preference when some subjects are really paid a large reward. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we 
explain our experimental design. In section 3, we report the results of the experiment 
and examine whether the delay, the interval, and the magnitude effects are confirmed by 
means of the test of the same mean, and a regression analysis. In section 4, we examine 
whether the discount rate and the degree of the delay effect of the subjects can explain 
their procrastinating behavior. In section 5, we present our conclusion. 
 
2.  Design of the experiment 
We try to measure subjective time discounting by asking subjects which of the two 
options they prefer: option A, to receive a reward X with a shorter delay s, and option B, 
to receive a (usually larger) reward Y, with a longer delay t. From these conditions, the 
rate of compensation for a postponement R is defined as 
st
XY
X −
−1 , and the interval h is 
defined as st − . 
We specified four values for s (2 days, 1 month, 90 days, 10 months), three values 
for h (7 days, 3 months, 12 months), and three values for the reward amount (240, 2800, 
and 800000 yuan). We also controlled for whether the reward specified in the pay-off 
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tables would really be paid, which we denote as P = (YES, NO). Combining these four 
conditions, we specified twelve sets of conditions (s, h, X, P), as shown in Table 1. Thus, 
the experiment consists of twelve rounds, each of which corresponds to one set of 
conditions.   
For each set of conditions, we asked about 32 pairs of options, each of which is 
specified with a value of R such that the value of the reward of the later option is Y. 
Thirty-two pairs of options are arranged in ascending order of R, which varies from a 
very low value of −20% to a very high value of 300% (annual rate), in a sheet that we 
call the “payoff table.”2 The subjects are expected to choose the earlier receipt A when 
R is small and the later receipt B when R becomes sufficiently large. Then, we define 
the time discount rate TDi,j for the condition j = (s, h, X, P) and the subject i with the 
value of R at which the subject switched from A to B.3 
The experiment was conducted on March 11, 2005 at Fudan University, 
Shanghai.4 The subjects were 29 undergraduate students recruited from the Department 
of World Economics at Fudan University. They were either 20 or 21 years old, and 25 
of the 29 subjects (86%) were female. The reward was paid by the following procedure. 
At the end of the experiment, starting from round one, we randomly selected one pair of 
options to be paid from the payoff table. Then we randomly selected one subject as a 
recipient of the reward amount on the date specified in the option that the subject had 
chosen.5 The highest reward presented in the payoff tables was 3920 yuan (800000 
                                                  
2 One payoff table is presented in Appendix.  
3 If a subject chooses A (B) for all 32 pairs, we regard the highest (lowest) value of R in the payoff 
table as TDij. If a subject switches multiple times, we discard the data because the subject had 
probably misunderstood the question. 
4 We conducted an experiment on risk aversion before the experiment on the time discount rate, on 
the same day. For the experiment on risk aversion, see Sasaki et al. (2008). 
5 Since this payment procedure was explained in the instructions and was rehearsed twice, the 
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yuan would not be paid), which was a relatively large amount, considering that the 
annual household income of the subjects was 20−40 thousand yuan. This helped to give 
the subjects an incentive to express their true preferences. Including a 120 yuan (about 
US$14) participation fee, the average payoff for both the experiments, on time 
discounting and risk aversion, was 788 yuan (about US$106). After we selected the 
winners, the subjects were required to complete a detailed questionnaire requesting their 
preferences, opinions, and attributes.  
 
3.  Results of the experiment 
3.1  Time discount rates elicited by the experiment 
In the bottom row of Table 1, we present the average and standard error of the discount 
rates, which reveal that the discount rates are distributed over a wide range from 1.0% 
to 44% (in the annual rate), depending on the experimental conditions. This implies that 
the conventional assumption of exponential discounting is not supported by the data. In 
other words, there exist anomalies that are probably associated with the delay, interval, 
and reward amount. In this section, we examine the delay, interval, and magnitude 
effects. We also investigate whether the results depend on the promise of the payment 
of a reward. 
 
3.2  Examination of the three anomalies in time discounting by means of tests of the 
same mean 
In our framework, the discount rates may differ depending on four experimental 
conditions: the delay s, the interval h, the reward amount X, and whether the payment is 
                                                                                                                                                  
subjects were expected to understand clearly that what they received would depend on their choice. 
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promised P. In this subsection, in each round we hold three of the four conditions 
constant and vary the fourth condition, and we test whether the mean discount rate 
varies.  
   
The delay effect 
To test the delay effect, we compare the rounds in which the interval and amount are the 
same but the delay differs.6 They are as follows: 
1)  Round 2 (30 days, 90 days, 240 yuan) vs. Round 4 (10 months, 90 days, 240 
yuan)  
2)  Round 5 (2 days, 7 days, 2800 yuan) vs. Round 6 (90 days, 7 days, 2800 yuan) 
3)  Round 7 (1 month, 3 months, 2800 yuan) vs. Round 9 (10 months, 3 months, 
2800 yuan) 
4)  Round 10 (1 month, 3 months, 800000 yuan) vs. Round 12 (10 months, 3 
months, 800000 yuan)  
The results of the test of the same mean are presented in Table 2. In all the 
combinations, the null hypothesis of the same mean is not rejected. Thus, the delay 
effect is not observed by the test of the same mean. 
 
The interval effect 
For the interval effect, three comparison tests, round 2 vs. 3, round 7 vs. 8, and round 10 
vs. 11, are possible, and the test results are presented in Table 3. When the reward 
amount is set at 240 or 2800 yuan, the discount rates are significantly higher in the 
shorter intervals than in the longer intervals, and this confirms the interval effect. 
                                                  
6 Whether the payment would be made or not is also controlled. 
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However, when the reward amount is set at 800000 yuan, the null of the same mean is 
not rejected. This is probably because people will choose sufficiently low discount rates 
for an extremely large amount such as 800000 yuan, so that a difference in the other 
conditions no longer changes the discount rates. The result of the interval effect is 
generally consistent with the subadditivity found by Read (2001).  
 
The magnitude effect 
The results of the tests of the magnitude effect are presented in Table 4. In the top panel, 
we show three test results comparing the reward of 240 and 2800 yuan. Results 
comparing the reward of 2800 and 800000 yuan are presented in the middle panel, and 
those comparing the reward of 240 and 800000 yuan are presented in the bottom panel. 
In all the combinations, the time discount rate is significantly higher for the smaller 
reward amount. Thus, the magnitude effect, in which the discount rates are inversely 
related to the reward amount, is significantly observed. This is consistent with the 
results of previous studies (Benzion et al. 1989, Kirby 1997, Kirby and Marakovic 1997, 
and Thaler 1981). 
 
The payment effect 
Finally, we examine whether the promise of payment affects the discount rates. Rounds 
1 and 7 are designed to have the same condition (s, h, X), and they differ only in that the 
reward is actually paid in round 5 but not in round 1. The test result of the same mean is 
presented in Table 5, which reveals that the null of the same mean is not rejected at all. 
As noted above, the reward of 2800 yuan was relatively large in China, and this result 
therefore has a strong implication: whether the reward is actually paid to the subjects 
has nothing to do with the time discount rates they report, as long as some of the 
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subjects will really be paid a large reward. This provides grounds for the validity of our 
experimental result with respect to the following: 1) although we did not pay rewards to 
all subjects except the winner of each round, the results as a whole are trustworthy, and 
2) the results of rounds 10–12, where the reward of 80000 yuan is only imaginary, are 
also reliable. 
 
3.3  Regression analysis for an investigation of three anomalies 
In the last subsection, we did not confirm the delay effect, but we did find the interval 
and magnitude effects. This is consistent with Read’s (2001) conclusion, and it implies 
that the conclusion of many previous studies that argued for the delay effect is false, 
because they did not separate the delay from the interval. However, we should not be 
hasty, because the comparison tests in the previous subsection may suffer from the 
problem of a small sample, and this may lead to a small power to reject the null of the 
same mean. Looking at Table 2 carefully, we see that the rounds of the 2-days delay 
reports a discount rate of 30.6%, which is substantially higher than 22% in round 6, for 
the 90-days delay. Although the p-value is only 32%, this may be a result of the small 
sample of 29. To avoid this weakness, we pool all the samples of 348, and conduct a 
regression analysis using them. 
The regression equation basically controlled all the experimental conditions: the 
delay s, the interval h, the reward amount X, and whether the reward is actually paid P. 
In particular, we adopt the following variables. For the variables standing for the delay, 
we use dummy variables jHOR2 , jHOR30 , and jHOR90 , which is equal to unity if 
the delay is 2 days, 1 month, and 3 months in round j, respectively, and 0 otherwise (10 
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months). For the amount of the reward, we use dummy variables jAMT240  and 
jAMT 2800 , which is equal to unity if the amount of reward is 240 and 2800 yuan, 
respectively, in round j , and 0 otherwise (800000 yuan). For the interval, we use a 
variable INTj , which is equal to the length of the interval in round j . Finally, we use a 
dummy variable PAYj , which is equal to unity if the reward will be paid in round j , 
and 0 otherwise. Thus, the regression equation is 
 
jijj
jjjjjij
PAYAMT
AMTINTHORHORHORTD
,76
543210
2800
24090302ln
εαα
αααααα
+++
+++++=
      (1) 
 
where jiTD ,ln  stands for the logarithm of subject i’s time discount rate in round j. 
The results of the regression are presented in Table 6. For the variables of the 
delay dummies, the estimated coefficient of jHOR2  is significantly positive, but those 
of jHOR30  and jHOR90  are insignificant, indicating that the delay effect operates 
only in 2-days delay, but not in the rounds where the delay is more than 30 days. This 
non-linear property of the delay effect is close to the quasi-hyperbolic discount model, 
in that people discount much of the future value between the present and the very near 
future, whereas they discount it moderately after that period (Laibson 1997). The result 
does not contradict Read (2001), who reported that the delay effect is not observed in 
the case of 6-months and 8-months delays, which are both substantially longer than 
ours.  
Let us briefly examine the other anomalies. The estimated coefficients of 
jAMT240  and jAMT 2800 are significantly positive, and that of INTj  is significantly 
negative. These results confirm the magnitude and interval effects, as we have already 
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confirmed by the test of the same mean. The estimated coefficient of PAYj  is 
insignificant, which is also consistent with the results in the previous subsection. Thus, 
when a part of the subjects are randomly chosen, and are actually paid a large reward 
amount, the subjects answer honestly those questions in which the reward is imaginary. 
Therefore, all of their responses in our experiment are reliable. 
Next, we consider the attributes of the subjects, gender, and household income. 
In particular, we add a dummy variable, MALE, which is equal to unity for male 
subjects and zero otherwise, and a dummy variable HINCOME, which is equal to unity 
if the subject’s annual household income is over 140 thousand yuan and zero otherwise. 
Five subjects are classified as high income and 18 as low income. Since 7 subjects who 
did not report household income were excluded, the number of observations is 23 for 
this regression. The estimates are presented in the right column of Table 6. Both 
coefficients of MALE and HINCOME are negative, but they are not significant at all. 
Thus, for our subjects, the discount rates are independent of these attributes. On the 
other hand, the three anomalies are clearly confirmed with this specification. The result 
that PAY has no effect also remains unchanged. 
 
3.4  Robustness check on our time discounting data 
We next examine the reliability of the discount rates elicited in the experiment. In the 
questionnaire that we asked subjects to complete at the end of the experiment, questions 
similar to those in the experiment were included. In particular, we asked the following 
five questions, each of which has a counterpart “round” in the experiment. 
QTD5, which corresponds to round 5: s = 2 days, h = 7 days, but X = 800 yuan 
instead of 2800 yuan. 
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QTD6, which corresponds to round 6: s = 90 days, h = 7 days, but X = 800 yuan 
instead of 2800 yuan. 
QTD3&8, which corresponds to rounds 3 and 8: s = 1 month, h = 12 months, but X = 
800 yuan instead of 240 and 2800 yuan. 
QTD11, which corresponds to round 11: s = 1 month, h = 12 months, and X = 
800000 yuan. 
We examine whether or not these four sets of data elicited by the questionnaire 
are consistent with the discount rates obtained from the experiment. The mean and 
standard deviation of the logarithm of the discount rates elicited by the questionnaire 
(QTD) and the experiment (ETD) are presented together with the experimental 
conditions, in the upper and middle panels of Table 7, respectively. Comparing QTD5 
with the corresponding ETD5, and QTD6 with ETD6, the former is higher than the latter, 
whereas the discount rate of QTD3&8 is lower than ETD3 and higher than ETD8. Thus, 
the discount rates with a larger reward amount are consistently lower. As we noted 
above, the corresponding pairs are different only in the reward amount, and the results 
correspond to the magnitude effect that we found in section 3.2. Thus, although the test 
of the same mean rejects the null of the same mean, the mean may be the same after we 
adjust the magnitude effect. 
To examine whether this is the case, we estimate the following equation (2), 
which differs from equation (1) only in that the logarithm of the reward amount is used 
here, instead of the amount dummies. 
  
jij
jjjjjij
PAY
AMTINTHORHORHORTD
,7
543210 90302ln
εα
αααααα
++
+++++=
     (2) 
where AMT is equal to either log240, log2800, or log800000. Then, the predicted value 
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of the discount rates from the experiment, ADJTD, is calculated by the following 
equation (3). For example, in the case of round 5, if the amount were set at 800 yuan 
instead of the actual 2800 yuan and the payment was not promised, the discount rate 
would be  
755,5, ˆ)2800log800(logˆln αα −−+≡ ii TDADJTD .                   (3) 
The mean and standard deviation of the values thus calculated are presented in 
Panel C of Table 7. The ADJTD values move closer to the discount rates from the 
questionnaire, as expected. Although the statistical test (Panel D of Table 7) rejects the 
null of the same mean between QTD5 and ADJTD5, and between QTD6 and ADJTD6, 
the null that QTD3&8 and ADJTD3 are the same is not rejected at the 30% level, and 
the null associated with QTD3&8 and ADJTD8 is not rejected at the 5% level. Thus, 
although the discount rates elicited by the questionnaire and the experiment are not 
exactly the same, in some cases they are close enough. 
The consistency between the discount rates elicited by the experiment and by the 
questionnaire is confirmed by another analysis. Table 8 presents the correlation 
coefficient between these discount rates and reveals that the correlation between the 
pairs of experimental conditions that are similar is relatively higher (highlighted in 
yellow) than that of the other pairs, implying that the subjects respond consistently to 
similar questions. 
These results indicate that the time discount rates elicited from the experiment 
are generally consistent with those elicited from the questionnaire, and that our 
experimental data are reliable. 
 
4.  Time discounting and procrastinating behavior 
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4.1  Analytical framework 
People are sometimes unable to behave as they had originally planned. Instead, they 
tend to postpone discomfort and enjoy pleasure earlier. In this section, we investigate 
whether the subjects’ time preference, as revealed in the experiment, can explain their 
procrastinating behavior. 
As an example of an unpleasant task in which people tend to procrastinate, we 
adopt homework assignments in childhood. In the questionnaire distributed at the end of 
the experiment, we asked when they did their assignments: 
 
“Thinking about when you were a child and you were given an assignment in 
school, when did you usually do the assignment?” (Circle ONE number) 
1. Got it done right away 
2. Tended to get it done early, before the due date 
3. Worked on it daily up until the due date 
4. Tended to get it done toward the end 
5. Got it done at the last minute 
 
From their answers, we define HWKi  as the number that subject i chose. A larger value 
of HWKi  means a stronger propensity to procrastinate. 
Our hypotheses are as follows. First, higher time discounting will lead to 
procrastinating behavior. Second, the delay effect may reinforce procrastinating 
behavior. A stronger delay effect means higher time discounting in the near future 
and/or lower discounting in the remote future. Therefore, controlling the average 
discount rate in the regression, a stronger delay effect implies higher time discounting in 
the near future, so that it seems to bring about procrastinating behavior. However, the 
case may not be so simple. The delay effect causes a preference reversal, so that people 
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subject to the delay effect often procrastinate, and then regret that they had 
procrastinated. Thus, after repeatedly suffering bitter regret, they may devise a way to 
prevent procrastination, in order to avoid having to regret a miserable outcome. If this is 
so, the stronger delay effect no longer results in greater procrastination.7 
Following O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), let us categorize individuals who 
show the delay effect into two types: naïfs and sophisiticates. Naïfs mistakenly believe 
that they will behave as they originally planned, and so they delay imminent costs and 
enjoy immediate rewards. On the other hand, sophisticates know that they will delay an 
unpleasant task until the date of the execution that was originally planned comes and 
that such procrastination may lead to a disaster in the end; therefore, they may 
undertake an unpleasant task now (Proposition 2 of O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). 
Given these arguments, we speculate that (i) if the subjects are naïfs, the delay 
effect will enhance their procrastination; (ii) however, if they are sophisticates, the 
delay effect may not promote procrastination clearly; it may even suppress 
procrastination. 
Thus, our regression equation is  
 
29,...,1, =+++= iuDLYTDHWK iiii δγβ .                      (4) 
We expect 0>γ . However the sign of δ  is not known a priori. It depends on whether 
the subjects are naïfs or sophisticates. 
 
4.2  Definition of variables used in the regression 
                                                  
7 Here we assume that slight procrastination does not bring about sufficient regret to stop further 
procrastination, even by sophisticates. 
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By construction, the relation should be estimated with individual data, so that we need 
to use the time discount rate and the degree of the delay effect for each person. Thus, 
the time discount rate of subject i, AVTDi , is defined as the average of the logarithms 
of the discount rates reported by subject i  in round j, LNTDij : that is,   
12/
12
1
ij
j
i LNTDAVTD ∑
=
= .                            (5) 
 
However, the simple average of the time discount rates elicited in different 
conditions may suffer from a problem. For example, we saw in Table 1 that the time 
discount rate in the case of large reward amount of 800000 yuan is much smaller than in 
the case of smaller reward amounts. Therefore, the difference in the discount rate 
between subjects in the case of the large reward amount is substantially smaller than in 
the case of the small reward amount. Thus, a simple average would underestimate the 
contribution of the discount rates in the case of the large reward amount. To be free 
from this bias, we first standardize logarithmic discount rates in each round to obtain 
)(
j
jijLNTD
ijSTDTD σ
μ−= , where jμ  and jσ  are the mean and standard deviation of 
logarithmic time discount rates in round j  over the subjects. Then, the standardized 
time discount rate for each subject is defined as 
 
12/
12
1
ij
j
i STDTDAVSTDTD ∑
=
= .                      (6) 
 
On the other hand, we define the degree of the delay effect of subject i, DLY , 
as the time discount rate in the case of 2-days delay subtracted from that of 90-days 
delay, that is,  
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           65 iii LNTDLNTDDLY −= ,                                  (7) 
 
because, as we confirmed in section 3.2, the delay effect exists only between these 
delays. Nonetheless, to check the robustness of our conclusions, we report the results 
using STDDLY, which is defined as the average of the differences in standardized time 
discount rates, that is,  
 
   
.4/)]()(
)()[(
121097
6542
iiii
iiiii
STDTDSTDTDSTDTDSTDTD
STDTDSTDTDSTDTDSTDTDSTDDLY
−+−+
−+−=         (8) 
 
4.3  Estimation results on procrastination 
Equation (4) is estimated by ordered probit because the dependent variable takes on 
integers from one to five, and a larger value represents stronger procrastination. The 
results using iDLY  as the degree of the delay effect are presented in the upper panel of 
Table 9. In the left columns, HWKi  is regressed only over the time discount rate, which 
reveals that the higher discount rates enhance the procrastination.8 Whether or not the 
discount rates are standardized does not change the results. The middle column of the 
table shows the estimates in the case in which HWKi  is regressed only over the degree 
of the delay effect, iDLY . Although iDLY  has a negative coefficient, it is not 
significant at all. In the columns on the right, HWKi  is regressed over both the time 
discount rate and the degree of the delay effect, confirming the above results: although 
the variables representing the time discount rate are significant at the 1% or 5% level, 
the coefficient of the degree of the delay effect iDLY  is negative, but not significant at 
all. 
                                                  
8 Note that the estimated coefficients do not represent the marginal effect on the value of the HWK. 
They represent the effect on the continuous latent variable corresponding to the HWK.  
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In the rightmost column of Table 9, we show the results using STDDLY instead 
of DLY . The time discount rates have similar coefficients, but the coefficient of 
STDDLY is significantly negative. In either case, the results that the coefficients of the 
degree of the delay effect are not positive suggest that our subjects may be 
sophisticates. 
One might suspect, however, that our results merely failed to reflect the reality, 
and are thus not reliable. To address this concern, we conduct an additional analysis. 
Following the model of naïfs and sophisticates in O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), and 
assuming that slight procrastination does not bring about regret strong enough to 
prevent further procrastination, even by sophisticates, we examine a hypothesis that 
consists of the following elements (see Table 10): 
1)  Among the naïfs, a higher delay effect brings about stronger procrastination 
(right column of Table 10).  
2)  Among the sophisticates with a high delay effect, the effect of the delay 
effect is not known a priori: the magnitude of the delay effect may not affect 
procrastination at all or it may even affect it negatively (left-upper cell of 
Table 10).  
3)  Among the sophisticates with a low delay effect, a higher delay effect may 
or may not bring about stronger procrastination (left-bottom cell of Table 
10). 
However, the hypothesis is not refutable, because we have not defined who are naïfs 
and who are sophisticates independently of the degree of the delay effect. It is natural to 
assume that sophisticates are more intellectual and introspective persons. Thus, in this 
study, we assume that all of our subjects are sophisticates, since the students of Fudan 
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University are undoubtedly the top elite in China. 
To substantiate our interpretation, we define a variable representing the degree of 
the delay effect of the higher group, HDEi, and a variable representing that of the lower 
group, LDEi, as follows: 
 
otherwise
DLYDLYifDLYHDE iii 0
≥
⎩⎨
⎧≡                              (9) 
 
otherwise
DLYDLYifDLYLDE iii 0
<
⎩⎨
⎧≡         ,                     (10) 
 
where DLY stands for a critical value dividing the subjects into two groups that will be 
specified below. The regression equation now becomes 
 
29,...,1, =++++= iLDEHDETDHWK iiLiHii νδδγβ .            (11) 
 
Our hypothesis is 0≥≤ LH δδ . On the contrary, if our subjects are all naïfs, 
then 0≥= LH δδ  will be obtained (see the middle panel of Table 10). 
To determine the critical value DLY , let us take a look at the histogram of DLY 
in Figure 1. It reveals that there are two spikes, at 0 and 0.74. We do not have a clear 
idea of how large the critical value that separates naïfs from sophisticates is. Thus, we 
arbitrarily adopt 0.7, 0.9, and 1.0, each of which gives divisions of the samples into 
(high group, low group) = (12, 17), (6, 23), (4, 25), respectively. The estimation results 
of equation (11) are presented in the upper panel of Table 10. When the critical value is 
set at 0.7 (the left column), the coefficient of the degree of the delay effect of the high 
group, HDE, is negative, and that of the low group, LDE, is positive, as expected. 
However, both of them are not significant. When we separate the groups at the value of 
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0.9, the coefficient of the high group becomes smaller and significant at the 10% level 
(see the middle column). When the critical value is set at 1.0, the coefficient of the high 
group again becomes smaller, with the p-value of 5.7% (the right column). The 
coefficient of the low group becomes larger, and its p-value also becomes smaller as the 
critical value is raised, although it does not become significant. Meanwhile, the time 
discount rate, AVTD, is significant at the 5% level in all cases. These results provide 
some evidence for the naïfs-sophisticates interpretation of our results. In sum, we obtain 
0<Hδ  and 0=Lδ . 
In the lower panel of Table 11, we present the results using the average of the 
degree of the delay effect, STDDLY, instead of the degree of the delay effect within the 
short delays, DLY. The histogram of STDDLY shown in Figure 2 reveals that 15 out of 
29 subjects do not report the delay effect, if this variable is taken as the indicator of the 
delay effect. Thus, we first stratify all the subjects who report negative STDDLY as the 
low-delay-effect group and all others as the high-delay-effect group, and define the 
degree of the delay effect of the high group, HSTDDLY, and that of the low group, 
LSTDDLY. The estimates in this case are presented in the left column, and they reveal 
that the high group (HSTDDLY) has a significant negative coefficient and the low group 
(LSTDDLY) has a positive coefficient, which is almost significant at the 10% level. 
Thus, we again obtain 0<Hδ  and 0=Lδ . When we raise the critical value to 0.1, the 
difference between these coefficients becomes smaller, which suggests that the critical 
value should be smaller.9 All the results in Table 11 are consistent with our speculation, 
i.e., the naïfs-sophisticates model.  
                                                  
9 However, we should be careful about the interpretation of the magnitude, because the value is not 
the marginal effect. 
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However, we should note that our analysis does not offer abundant evidence for 
the naïfs-sophisticates model. This study has, at best, found that the model seems to 
hold for a specific sample of the students at Fudan University, while many studies, 
including Hiruma and Ikeda (2007) and Tsutsui et al. (2007) have found a positive 
correlation between the degree of the delay effect and the loan amount. The 
naïfs-sophisticates model interprets this as the former results being obtained for 
sophisticates and the latter results for naïfs, but this interpretation may seem arbitrary. 
To confirm that the model describes the reality, it is necessary to find a negative 
correlation between the degree of the delay effect and procrastination in more cases. In 
addition, although our presumption that our subjects are all sophisticates may be 
reasonable because they are all students of the top university, it is still necessary to 
examine our hypothesis presented in Table 10, using broader data consisting of both 
naïfs and sophisticates. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
This study investigated the time discounting of human beings by an economic 
experiment. Economic experiments are often termed as unreliable because the subjects 
recruited do not have sufficient incentives to report their true preference. Our 
experiment is immune to such criticism because the highest reward shown to the 
subjects is close to their monthly household income. 
This study achieved two goals. First, the delay effect people discount the near 
future more than the remote future is substantiated by explicitly separating the delay 
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from the interval.10 Most previous studies have not separated these two experimental 
conditions, while Read (2001) identified these two conditions and reported that the 
delay effect was not found. Setting shorter delays than Read, we substantiated the delay 
effect for a delay of less than 90 days. This finding is important because the delay effect 
induces people to make time-inconsistent plans and then to regret their decision. 
Another contribution of this study is its explanation of the subjects’ 
procrastinating behavior by their time discount rates and the degree of the delay effect. 
Higher time discounting always promote procrastination, but the delay effect involves 
two competing consequences for procrastination: it has a positive effects when it is not 
strong, but it reduces procrastination when it is strong. Our results are consistent with 
the naïfs-sophisticates model developed by O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999).  
                                                  
10 At the same time, we confirmed the interval effect, in which subjects discount the future more in 
shorter intervals than in longer intervals, and the magnitude effect, in which they discount the future 
more for smaller amounts of money. 
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Table 1. Experimental conditions and mean discount rates 
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Delay (s) 1 month 1 month 1 month 10 months 2 days 90 days 
Interval (h) 3 months 3 months 1 year 3 months 7 days 7 days 
Rewards (X) 2800 240 240 240 2800 2800 
Payment (P) No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mean discount rate 9.586  40.034  23.793  43.828  30.638 22.121  
Standard deviation 11.228  40.498  20.304  46.475  49.328 37.841  
       
Round 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Delay (s) 1 month 1 month 10 months 1 month 1 month 10 months
Interval (h) 3 months 1 year 3 months 3 months 1 year 3 months 
Rewards (X) 2800 2800 2800 800000 800000 800000 
Pay (P) Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Mean discount rate 8.276  5.819  9.034  1.103  1.491  0.959  
Standard deviation 6.866  5.105  10.987  2.033  3.525  1.612  
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Table 2. Discount rates’ and delays       
Round 2 4 5 6 7 9 10 12 
Delay (s) 1 month 300 2 days 90 days 1 month 300 1 month 10 months
Interval (h) 3 months 3 months 7 days 7 days 3 months 3 months 3 months 3 months
Rewards (X) 240 240 2800 2800 2800 2800 800000 800000 
Payment (P) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Observations 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Mean discount 
rate 40.034 43.828 30.638 22.121 8.276  9.034  1.103  0.959  
95% upper bound 24.630 26.149 11.875 7.727  5.664  4.855  0.329  0.346  
95% lower bound 55.439 61.506 49.401 36.514 10.887 13.214 1.876  1.573  
P-value 0.617  0.317  0.455  0.638  
 26
 
Table 3. Discount rates and intervals 
Round 2 3 7 8 10 11 
Delay (s)  1 month  1 month  1 month  1 month  1 month  1 month
Interval (h) 3 months 1 year 3 months 1 year 3 months 1 year 
Rewards (X) 240 240 2800 2800 800000 800000 
Payment (P) Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Observations 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Mean discount 
rate 40.034  23.793 8.276  5.819  1.103  1.491  
95% upper bound 24.630  16.070 5.664  3.877  0.329  0.151  
95% lower bound 55.439  31.516 10.887 7.761  1.876  2.832  
P-value 0.003  0.003  0.538  
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 Table 4. Discount rates and reward amounts 
Round 2 7 3 8 4 9 
Delay (s) 30 30 30 30 300 300 
Interval (h) 90 90 365 365 90 90 
Rewards (X) 240 2800 240 2800 240 2800 
Payment (P) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Mean discount 
rate 
40.034 8.276 23.793 5.819 43.828 9.034 
95% upper bound 24.63 5.664 16.07 3.877 26.149 4.855 
95% lower bound 55.439 10.887 31.516 7.761 61.506 13.214 
P-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  
       
Round 7 10 8 11 9 12 
Delay (s) 30 30 30 30 300 300 
Interval (h) 90 90 365 365 90 90 
Rewards (X) 2800 800000 2800 800000 2800 800000 
Payment (P) Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Observations 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Mean discount 
rate 
8.276 1.103 5.819 1.491 9.034 0.959 
95% upper bound 5.664 0.329 3.877 0.151 4.855 0.346 
95% lower bound 10.887 1.876 7.761 2.832 13.214 1.573 
P-value 0.000  0.001 0.001 
       
Round 2 10 3 11 4 12 
Delay (s) 30 30 30 30 300 300 
Interval (h) 90 90 365 365 90 90 
Rewards (X) 240 800000 240 800000 240 800000 
Payment (P) Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Observations 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Mean discount 
rate 
40.034 1.103 23.793 1.491 43.828 0.959 
95% upper bound 24.63 0.329 16.07 0.151 26.149 0.346 
95% lower bound 55.439 1.876 31.516 2.832 61.506 1.573 
P-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  
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Table 5. Discount rates and the payment of the reward 
 
Round 1 7 
Delay (s) 30 30 
Interval (h) 90 90 
Rewards (X) 2800 2800 
Payment (P) No Yes 
Observations 29 29 
Mean discount rate 9.586  8.276 
95% upper bound 5.315  5.664 
95% lower bound 13.857  10.887 
P-value 0.461  
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Table 6. Result of the regression analysis on three anomalies  
  Estimated  coefficient P-value
Estimated 
coefficient P-value
Estimated  
coefficient P-value 
Constant −1.074  0.000 −1.070 0.000 6.067  0.000 
HOR2 0.765  0.004 0.733  0.010 0.572  0.053 
HOR30 0.077  0.651 0.198  0.276 0.072  0.712 
HOR90 0.336  0.203 0.297  0.295 0.249  0.400 
AMT240 4.413  0.000 4.518  0.000   
AMT2800 2.941  0.000 3.113  0.000   
log(AMT)     −0.526  0.000 
INT −0.001  0.018 −0.002 0.012 −0.001  0.044 
PAY 0.001  0.997 −0.029 0.918 0.064  0.829 
MALE   −0.016 0.971   
HINCOME   −0.148 0.720   
Number of 
observations 348 276 348 
Number of 
subjects 29 23 29 
R2 0.6284 0.6525 0.616  
Note: regression equation is 
jijjjjjjjij PAYAMTAMTINTHORHORHORTD ,76543210 280024090302ln εαααααααα ++++++++=
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Table 7.  Comparisons of discount rates in the questionnaire and the experiment 
 
Panel A: Questionnaire 
 QTD5 QTD6 QTD3&8  QTD11 
Delay (s) 2 days 90 days 1 month  1 month 
Interval (h) 7 days 7 days 1 year  1 year 
Rewards (X) 800 800 800  800000 
Payment (P) No No No  No 
QTD: Mean 3.809  3.677  2.271   0.004  
Standard Deviation 1.294  1.278  0.765   1.145  
Standard error 0.249  0.242  0.145   0.213  
95% upper bound 3.297  3.181  1.974   −0.432  
95% lower bound 4.321  4.173  2.568    0.439  
 
Panel B: Experiment 
 ETD5 ETD6 ETD3 ETD8 ETD11 
Delay (s) 2 days 90 days 1 month 1 month 1 month 
Interval (h) 7 days 7 days 1 year 1 year 1 year 
Rewards (X) 2800 2800 240 2800 800000 
Payment (P) Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
ETD: Mean  2.622  2.194  2.816  1.392  −1.425  
Standard Deviation 1.386  1.468  0.892  0.962  1.991  
Standard error 0.257  0.273  0.166  0.179  0.370  
95% upper bound 2.095  1.635  2.477  1.026  −2.182  
95% lower bound 3.149  2.752  3.156  1.758  −0.667  
 
Panel C: Adjusted discount rates 
 ADJTD5 ADJTD6 ADJTD3 ADJTD8 
Delay (s) 2 days 90 days 1 month 1 month 
Interval (h) 7 days 7 days 1 year 1 year 
Rewards (X) 2800 2800 240 2800 
Payment (P) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ADJTD: Mean 2.789  2.789  2.119  1.988  
Standard deviation 1.386  1.468  0.892  0.962  
Standard error 0.257  0.273  0.166  0.179  
95% upper bound 2.262  2.231  1.780  1.622  
95% lower bound 3.316  3.347  2.458  2.354  
 
Notes: QTD and ETD are the logarithm of the discount rates elicited by the questionnaire 
and the experiment, respectively. Adjusted discount rates are calculated from the regression 
shown in the rightmost column of Table 6. 
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Panel D: Mean comparison test of the discount rate in the questionnaire and the experiment  
 
Compared group QTD5 ADJTD5 QTD6 ADJTD6 QTD3&8 ADJTD3 
Number of Observations 29          27 29             28 29         28 
P-value 0.000  0.001  0.303  
       
Comparison QTD3&8 ADJTD8 QTD11 ETD11  
  Number of Observations 29          29 29             29 
 
P-value 0.061 0.002   
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Table 8.  Correlation between QTD and ETD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: QTD and ETD are the logarithm of the discount rates elicited by the questionnaire and the experiment, respectively.  
The cells highlighted in yellow indicate the correlation between the pairs of experimental conditions that are similar. 
P-values are in parentheses. 
 QTD5 QTD6 QTD3&8 QTD11 ETD5 ETD6 ETD3 ETD8 ETD11 
QTD5 1.000          
0.901  QTD6 
(0.000) 
1.000         
0.545  0.417  QTD3&8
(0.003) (0.027) 
1.000        
−0.067  −0.149 0.174  QTD11 
(0.738) (0.450) (0.375) 
1.000       
0.700  0.580  0.345  0.102  ETD5 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.072) (0.598) 
1.000      
0.733  0.751  0.414  0.014  0.697  ETD6 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.029) (0.941) (0.000) 
1.000     
0.340  0.234  0.354  0.058  0.297  0.375  ETD3 
(0.082) (0.232) (0.065) (0.765) (0.117) (0.045) 
1.000    
0.256  0.088  0.557  0.282  0.333  0.297  0.536  ETD8 
(0.198) (0.655) (0.002) (0.138) (0.077) (0.127) (0.003) 
1.000   
−0.144  −0.232 0.056  0.838  −0.062 −0.171 0.067  0.296  ETD11 
(0.475) (0.235) (0.775) (0.000) (0.751) (0.374) (0.730) (0.120) 
1.000  
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Table 9. Time discounting and procrastination         
       
 
Estimated  
coefficient P-value 
Estimated 
coefficient P-value
Estimated 
coefficient P-value
Estimated 
coefficient P-value
Estimated 
coefficient P-value
Estimated 
coefficient P-value 
Constant 0.331  0.487  1.394  0.000 1.278  0.000 0.357  0.459 1.413  0.000 1.699  0.000  
AVTD 0.794  0.009      0.803  0.008     
AVSTDTD   0.774  0.030     0.775  0.030 1.535  0.001  
DLY     −0.033 0.855 −0.070 0.706 −0.036 0.842   
STDDLY           −1.692 0.008  
2μ  1.402  0.000  1.345  0.000 1.223  0.000 1.418  0.000 1.351  0.000 1.720  0.000  
3μ  2.053  0.000  1.952  0.000 1.759  0.000 2.065  0.000 1.956  0.000 2.405  0.000  
4μ  3.171  0.000  3.018  0.000 2.746  0.000 3.178  0.000 3.019  0.000 3.502  0.000  
Log likelihood −38.636  −39.821  −42.204  −38.564  −39.801  −36.017  
R2 0.228  0.157  0.001  0.232  0.158  0.370  
Observations 29 29 29 29 29 29 
 
Note: 2μ  to 4μ  are estimates of boundary values, where the smallest boundary 0μ  is set to –infinity, the largest boundary 5μ  is set to infinity. 1μ  is 
normalized to zero, for estimating the constant. Note that the estimated coefficient is not the marginal effect. 
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Table 10.  Expected sign of correlation between the degree of delay effect and the degree of procrastination Hδ  and Lδ  
 
  sophisticates  naïfs  
degree of      
 delay effect correlation sign of correlation  correlation sign of correlation 
 
high 
  
−  or  0  or  + 
  
+ 
      
low  0  or  +   0  or  + 
     
 
Note: δ  represents the correlation between the degree of delay effect and the degree of procrastination.  
Superscripts S and N stand for sophisticates and naïfs, respectively.  
Subscripts H and L means high degree and low degree of procrastination, respectively. 
 
 
Comparison of the correlation between high and low 
 
type of person sophisticates naïfs 
 
 
  
 
 
Comparison of the correlation between sophisticates and naïfs 
 
degree of delay effect high low 
 
 
  
 
 
 
N
L
N
H δδ =
N
Lδ
N
HδSHδ
S
Lδ
S
L
S
H δδ ≤
N
H
S
H δδ < NLSL δδ ≤
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Table 11. Procrastinating behavior of Naïfs and Sophisticates 
 
        
  
Estimated 
coefficient P-value 
Estimated 
coefficient P-value 
Estimated  
coefficient P-value 
Constant 1.628  0.000  1.694  0.000  1.717  0.000  
AVTD 0.828  0.022  0.963  0.010  0.944  0.012  
HDLY −0.330 0.247  –0.505  0.090  −0.597  0.057  
LDLY 0.220  0.402  0.294  0.231  0.308  0.198  
2μ  1.409  0.000  1.535  0.000  1.600  0.000  
3μ  2.016  0.000  2.168  0.000  2.248  0.000  
4μ  3.130  0.000  3.282  0.000  3.363  0.000  
Log likelihood −38.848  −37.554  −36.947  
R2 0.215  0.289  0.322  
Number of observations 29 29 29 
Critical value of DLY 0.7 0.9 1 
 (High group, Low group) (12, 17) (6, 23) (4, 25) 
       
          
  
Estimated 
coefficient P-value 
Estimated 
coefficient P-value     
Constant 3.493  0.023  2.026  0.001    
AVSTDTD 2.138  0.024  1.434  0.004    
HSTDDLY −4.242 0.027  −2.375 0.021    
LSTDDLY 0.836  0.101  −0.749 0.551    
2μ  2.801  0.034  1.791  0.000    
3μ  3.413  0.012  2.461  0.000    
4μ  5.129  0.002  3.560  0.000    
Log likelihood −13.294  −35.637    
R2 0.723  0.390    
Number of observations 29 29   
Critical value of STDDLY 0.0  0.1    
(High group, Low group) (14, 15) (11, 18)     
 
Note: Refer to the footnote of Table 9. 
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Figure 1.  Histogram of the degree of the delay effect, DLY 
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Figure 2.  Histogram of the standardized degree of the delay effect, STDDLY 
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Appendix: Payoff table used in the experiment (Round 1) 
 
① Payoff table (2,800.00 yuan, 1 month vs. 4 months, reward is not actually paid) 
 
Number of the 
option pair 
Option A (yuan)
(receipt at 1 
month later) 
Option B 
(yuan) 
(receipt at 4 
month later)
Rate of return 
(annual rate) Answers 
1 2,800.00 2,730.00 −10% A B 
2 2,800.00 2,765.04 −5% A B 
3 2,800.00 2,772.00 −4% A B 
4 2,800.00 2,779.04 −3% A B 
5 2,800.00 2,786.00 −2% A B 
6 2,800.00 2,793.04 −1% A B 
7 2,800.00 2,800.00 0% A B 
8 2,800.00 2,807.04 1% A B 
9 2,800.00 2,814.00 2% A B 
10 2,800.00 2,821.04 3% A B 
11 2,800.00 2,828.00 4% A B 
12 2,800.00 2,835.04 5% A B 
13 2,800.00 2,842.00 6% A B 
14 2,800.00 2,849.04 7% A B 
15 2,800.00 2,856.00 8% A B 
16 2,800.00 2,863.04 9% A B 
17 2,800.00 2,870.00 10% A B 
18 2,800.00 2,877.04 11% A B 
19 2,800.00 2,884.00 12% A B 
20 2,800.00 2,891.04 13% A B 
21 2,800.00 2,898.00 14% A B 
22 2,800.00 2,905.04 15% A B 
23 2,800.00 2,912.00 16% A B 
24 2,800.00 2,919.04 17% A B 
25 2,800.00 2,926.00 18% A B 
26 2,800.00 2,933.04 19% A B 
27 2,800.00 2,940.00 20% A B 
28 2,800.00 2,975.04 25% A B 
29 2,800.00 3,010.00 30% A B 
30 2,800.00 3,080.00 40% A B 
31 2,800.00 3,150.00 50% A B 
32 2,800.00 3,220.00 60% A B 
 
Notes: 1. Please circle A or B, whichever you prefer. 
2. If you circled a wrong option, correct the answer with a double line. 
